FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 04/01/2020

Curtis Page [redacted], was interviewed in person [redacted] Tempe, Arizona. Also present was Special Agent George Scavdis, Food and Drug Administration Office of Criminal Investigations. After being advised of the identity of the interviewers and the nature of the interview, Page provided the following information:

Page was part of an Accountable Care Organization, called Commonwealth Primary Care, which partnered with healthcare providers and vendors, like Theranos. Theranos also had a lab in Page's office. Theranos charged 50% of Medicare rates, which was far less than Sonora Quest and LabCorp. Theranos was cheaper, easier, and cost less, than the other labs.

In Page's office, Theranos was very secretive. Everything in Theranos' space was under lock and key, such as the cabinets. Theranos said it was because of their proprietary technology, but Page did not understand what this meant. There were no Theranos' testing devices in Page's office and the blood was taken by vein draw, not through Theranos' finger draw device, in his office. Theranos' phlebotomist was in Page's office to draw the blood for about one and a half years. Since Theranos drew the blood in the office, Page was not sure exactly what was under lock and key in the room. Theranos did not say what was proprietary and did not mention reagents.

Theranos said they would be drawing blood from patients' finger tips and testing on these micro samples, but that never happened. Theranos' rates remained 50% of Medicare's rates.

There were a lot of abnormal A1C test results, which Page brought up to Theranos. Theranos conducted an investigation and blamed Siemens' devices. Theranos fixed the device and re-did the tests, notifying the doctors by letters. Page was concerned that he had to point out the issue and wondered

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by Adelaida Hernandez

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about the status of Theranos' quality checks. The matter was handled in a "very hush, hush" manner, where Theranos did not take responsibility.

Theranos presented to the ACO's board a couple of times, telling them about how Theranos' rates were 50% of Medicare rates and the testing on micro samples of blood. Doctors were among the ACO's board, which were present for the presentation. Lance Donkerbrook was the Chief Operating Officer of the ACO at the time, and was now it's Chief Executive Officer. Page was present at some of these meetings.

After Theranos' went into Page's office, Page asked about Theranos' finger draw. Theranos explained it was for certain tests, without providing details on which (or how many) tests. Eventually, Theranos completely abandoned the finger draw. Page did not specifically recall discussions about Theranos' accuracy or FDA approval. Page thought Theranos said they were in the process of FDA approval and it was merely a matter of time. Page met once with Elizabeth Holmes, who came to one of the meetings.

Theranos seemed innovated and disruptive, which was the kind of vendor the ACO looked for. Of course, accuracy of the blood tests were important. Theranos' Board of Directors, such as Henry Kissinger, impressed Page and made Theranos seem legitimate. Theranos presented information about their Board of Directors to the ACO in its meetings. Holmes, at a meeting, spoke emotionally about losing her father, or a relative, to a bad lab test. In total, Theranos had four to five meetings with the ACO's board.

Page ordered general reference tests, such as CBCs and A1Cs. The other Theranos blood tests, except the A1Cs, seemed fine. The A1C issue took two to three months for Theranos to admit something was wrong. Mike Phebus was Theranos' sales representative that spoke with Page. Phebus told Page that Theranos was looking at the issue. Eventually, Theranos said it was the Siemens machine and Theranos had switched devices. Page repeated he did not understand how Theranos did not recognize the issue.

Considering all of Theranos' investors, the investments they made, Theranos' equipment, the information in the media about Theranos, it never occurred to Page that the test result would be anything but accurate. The A1C issue was six months to a year before the Wall Street Journal article. About 200 patients' A1Cs seemed impacted. For those patients, their blood

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was run through another lab free of charge (and Theranos refunded their test). Page still thought there was a noticeable delay before Theranos acknowledged and fixed the problem. These patients all had vein draws. Page's office continued to use Theranos after these issues. Sometime after the Wall Street Journal article, Page's office stopped using Theranos.

Page did not know if other tests had problems.

Page had an email from around August 2016, requesting A1C data from Theranos for a list of patients. There were about 7,000 patient results in the email.

When Page learned about the sanctions against Theranos, Theranos blamed all the sanctions on the lab in Newark, California. Theranos told Page that all of his patients' test results had been run through Arizona, and that the sanctions had nothing to do with the Arizona lab. The Arizona lab had different machines, so Theranos' lab sanctions did not impact Arizona.